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Strategic Interactions Among Private and Public Efforts when Preventing 
and Stamping Out an Highly Infectious Animal Disease 
 
Abstract:  
Upon outbreak of a contagious animal disease, a primary motive for restoring disease-free 
status is often to regain access to international product markets. Efforts applied toward 
continuing or regaining such access is a public good—all growers benefit regardless of extent 
of private efforts taken while exclusion is impractical. Private incentives to take preventive 
measures and stamp-out efforts interact in complex ways. There are intra-farm temporal 
interactions and also inter-farm contemporaneous interactions. Public effort also takes place 
and interacts with private efforts. This paper provides a succinct multi-agent model to explore 
these interactions in social optimum and in Nash equilibrium, and also to explore how socially 
optimal and Nash behavior differ. Comparative statics under social optimality are more 
straightforward than under Nash equilibrium. Whether in social optimum or Nash equilibrium, 
public prevention efforts complement both private prevention and private stamp-out efforts. 
However, public stamp-out efforts substitute for both private stamp-out and private prevention 
efforts. Reasonable conditions are identified under which Nash levels of private prevention and 
stamp-out efforts are both below socially optimal levels. Concerning policy prescriptions, 
efforts to secure property rights and reduce property transfer costs should promote prevention 
and eradication efforts. Other things equal, public prevention effort should be more effective in 
promoting welfare than comparable public stamp-out effort. Subsidies on private efforts should 
favor prevention efforts because subsidies on eradication effort may discourage prevention 
effort. Even if produce from diseased animals is safe to consume and acceptable to consumers, 
it may be optimal to destroy such produce. 
 
Keywords: animal health management, biosecurity; disease prevention; SIS; strategic 
interactions; trade ban 
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The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) allows 
countries to implement trade bans on livestock and produce imports from a country as a 
precaution in the event of a disease outbreak in the country of origin.1 In order to provide 
scientific grounding for such measures while mitigating protectionist opportunism, the World 
Organization for Animal Health (henceforth, OIE) has put in place a list of animal diseases 
viewed as specific hazards. If the disease is zoonotic or poses significant health threats to either 
domesticated or wild animals in the country seeking to impose the ban, a country that is free or 
almost free of the disease may impose a trade ban on the affected country without violating 
WTO commitments. Many of the listed diseases have been the subject of significant trade bans 
in recent years. In many cases, restricted market access has been intermittent where the disease 
at issue has recurred. This has been the case with Classical Swine Fever, Newcastle Disease 
and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy for various countries, but the most disruptive of these 
listed diseases has been Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD).  
Among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, 
FMD remains endemic to Turkey. Greece is FMD-free without vaccination, but outbreaks 
occurred in 1996 and again in 2000 (Junker, Komorowska, and van Tongeren 2009). The 
United Kingdom had occurrences in 1981, 2001, and again in 2007. Ireland, which had been 
free since 1941, also suffered an outbreak in 2001. France shared the United Kingdom 
outbreaks in 1981 and 2001 while the Netherlands had outbreaks in 1984 and again in 2001. 
Japan had been FMD-free since 1908 until outbreaks in 2000 and again in 2010. South Korea’s 
FMD disease history status is similar—its first outbreak since 1934 occurred in 2000, followed 
by outbreaks in 2002 and 2010. The virus is readily transmissible by aerosol, wildlife and on-
farm equipment, while eradication, or stamp-out, efforts may cause widespread disruption to 
                                                 
1 Trade bans can be at a sub-country region level. This understood, we will henceforth refer to 
country bans. 
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the general economy.  
Losses to a country are difficult to assess because market disruptions lead to shifting and 
volatile prices and require estimates on shifts in spending elsewhere in the economy. In the 
1990s, Taiwan’s hog sector exported almost one-third of its output to Japan and ranked third 
among global pork exporters. Its 1997 FMD outbreak decimated the industry (Felt, Gervais, 
and Larue 2011). Since then, the country has struggled to attain disease-free status, with 
several subsequent outbreaks, including one in May 2013. Long-term investment in sector 
development has been impeded due to uncertainty about prospects for international access, as 
produce from countries that are not disease free, or are free with vaccination, are also subject to 
import bans. The outbreak in the UK in 2001 involved the slaughter of 6 million animals and is 
estimated to have cost in the order of $11 billion in 2001 money (Thompson et al. 2002). 
Pendell et al. (2007) estimated that an outbreak at a medium-sized beef feedlot in southwest 
Kansas could result in a $200 million reduction in the region’s total economic activity. 
OIE-listed diseases can presumably be eradicated from a country or region because a 
disease is not listed whenever they are endemic to all countries. The epidemiology modeling 
literature refers to diseases where recurrence can occur as SIS diseases.2 In addition, prevention 
and stamp-out involve externalities, in that the behavior of one’s neighbors matters. One of the 
pecuniary losses from this class of diseases is reduced market returns due to impeded access to 
international markets. This loss is shared by all growers regardless of farm disease status. The 
effort costs are private but the benefits from restored access are shared by all.  
It is also important to recognize that prevention and stamp-out interventions are taken in 
different states. Prevention actions are taken in the susceptible state while stamp-out actions 
                                                 
2 Other types of disease include susceptible-infected (SI) where the unit of analysis is not cured 
and susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) where the unit of analysis is cured and becomes 
immune. 
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are taken in the infected state. There is of course reason to believe that these decisions are 
linked. For example, if it is not costly to prevent recurrence then the incentive to try stamp-out 
is strong, while if it is not costly to stamp out then the incentive to prevent is weak.  
In this paper, we will develop a multi-agent dynamic model of a SIS disease where (a) 
market losses are incident on all growers once a disease is detected, (b) prevention efforts, 
whether public or private, provide pure public goods, and (c) stamp-out efforts, public or 
private, also provide pure public goods. The focus of our paper is on strategic interactions 
across disease states and agents. For example, we are interested in how one grower’s 
prevention effort when in the non-diseased state affects another grower’s stamp-out effort 
when in the diseased state? Or how does an exogenous shock to stamp-out costs affect 
prevention actions?  
The literature on infectious disease management in human health is vast, but those 
emphasizing the strategic dimension is, perhaps surprisingly, small. Examples include Kremer 
(1996), Geoffard and Philipson (1997), and Manfredi and d’Onofris (2013). The literature 
emphasizing strategic issues in animal health is small. Insights do not generally transfer from 
human health economics because incentives and ownership structures are not comparable 
across the two fields while such policies as slaughter and absolute movement control have no 
parallel among human health policy options.  
Horan and Wolf (2005) use optimal control methods to study optimal management of a 
disease where farmed animals can be cross-infected by a valuable harvested wild animal 
population, but they do not address private incentives. Gramig, Horan, and Wolf (2009) devise 
indemnity payments to encourage preventive biosecurity and reporting actions when growers 
act strategically on private information about disease on their farms. Wang and Hennessy 
(2014) investigate how market rewards for voluntary release of disease test information can 
have a rational bandwagon effect, such that successively more herd owners voluntarily test and 
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release information. Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen (2005) point out that when disease 
transmission accompanies trade motivated by regional differences in feed availabilities then a 
socially inefficient low-productivity equilibrium can result such that it is optimal to encumber 
the live animal trade. Hennessy (2007) characterizes a preventive action when the probability 
of acquiring a disease depends on what others do and the gains from being disease free are 
entirely private. Hennessy (2008) demonstrates the complementary nature of private actions to 
protect against entry of a highly infectious disease into a region, but Reeling and Horan (2013) 
qualify the finding when grower actions protect against both entry and spread of an infection.  
A separate literature considers dynamic issues in animal disease infection, but without 
accommodating strategic interactions. Mahul and Gohin (1999) note that vaccination in the 
event of an outbreak precludes such vaccinated animals from certain markets so that trade 
losses would persist even after stamping out. For this reason there is merit to waiting for 
further information on the extent of a problem before choosing vaccination as a control 
method. Olson and Roy (2008) identify conditions under which stamping out a biological 
invasion is optimal. Private incentives are not incorporated into their analysis. Niemi and 
Lehtonen (2011) use dynamic programming to study production decisions when a trade ban 
may materialize. 
In this paper, we first explain the sorts of actions of interest, where FMD is used as the 
contextualizing disease. We then develop a general model of prevention and stamp-out 
decisions, where the benefits of having collective disease-free status are shared, but some of 
the costs of becoming and remaining there are private. This paper is distinct in that it integrates 
prevention and eradication incentives when both efforts provide private externalities. It is also 
distinct in that the benefit, a trade ban removal, is a pure public good. We use the model to 
analyze socially efficient and Nash private optimality contexts. 
Our analysis finds that an increase in publicly provided stamp-out effort decreases the 
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socially optimal levels of both private prevention and private stamp-out efforts. On the other 
hand, an increase in public prevention effort increases the socially optimal level of private 
stamp-out effort and has an ambiguous effect on private prevention effort. There are natural 
complementarities among prevention efforts as all agents have an incentive not to be the 
weakest link in letting a disease in. If these complementarities overcome the incentive to free-
ride on collective disease prevention efforts then an increase in public prevention effort will 
increase the socially optimal levels of both prevention and stamp-out efforts. Socially optimal 
responses to changes in costs are also studied. It is argued that the socially optimal extent of 
private prevention should decrease in response to an own-cost increase whereas the socially 
optimal level of private effort to stamp out might plausibly increase, in response to an increase 
in own cost. The possibility of upward sloping factor demand arises because the diseased state 
becomes less desirable when cost of exit from the state increases.  
In Nash equilibrium, we show that actions to stamp out substitute, whereas prevention 
actions may be strategic complements. They will be strategic complements whenever free-
riding is not a major concern. In general, due to the variety of ways in which responses can 
occur, little can be inferred about how prevention and stamp-out actions interact and respond to 
external stimuli in Nash equilibrium unless further assumptions are made. We posit a simple 
set of technologies that allow for insights on the nature of Nash equilibrium prevention and 
stamp-out action responses to cost shocks and to public interventions. These lend support to the 
ideas that private efforts to prevent and stamp-out are too low for the social good and that 
public effort to prevent are more effective than public efforts to cure. The paper concludes with 
some brief comments.  
 
A Context 
In this section we seek to clarify the nature of actions that are to be modeled. Four types of 
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actions arise in the model, these being privately taken disease prevention and stamp-out actions 
as well as publicly taken actions of these sorts. In order to better explain what we mean, we 
note that European Union (EU) Directive 2003/85/EC specifies much detail on required FMD 
prevention and control efforts. The directive requires that each EU member state maintain or 
arrange for a reference laboratory focused on ascertaining whether FMD is present. Member 
states are also required to draw up plans for dealing with an outbreak and to engage in 
exercises with neighboring states. These are examples of public efforts taken when a country is 
disease-free to prevent and minimize the extent of an outbreak before it is recognized. 
Under this directive the public sector is also required to ensure that leftovers from human 
food consumption are not fed to cloven-hoofed animals, an endeavor that also calls for private 
sector preventive efforts. Other private sector prevention activities, not covered in the directive, 
include on-farm biosecurity protocols concerning who enters a livestock premises, investment 
in wash-down facilities for people and vehicles entering the premises and maintenance of such 
records as to support animal tracing in the event of an incident. An aware and attentive 
stockman might also prevent by isolating an animal with symptoms in a half day period prior 
to the disease becoming infective (Charleston et al. 2011). 
Public stamp-out efforts covered by the directive include maintenance of procedures and 
resources to initiate an official investigation, to sample and test during a stamp-out campaign, 
to control animal movement, to conduct an inventory of risky materials on identified farms, to 
cull animals, and to dispose of animals and other risky materials. Private stamp-out efforts 
mentioned in the directive include the requirement to promptly notify a suspect case to public 
authorities, and also costs involved in cleaning and disinfecting the premises. Private costs will 
also be incurred when providing information to authorities investigating case origin, in 
maintaining movement-controlled animals, and in disposing of dung other than as manure. 
Such costs will be incident on movement-controlled farms close to a farm known to be 
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infected, and not just on the farm itself. Although these farms may face legal requirements to 
incur such costs, the growers will have some discretion on the extent of costs they choose to 
incur. More broadly, all farms in the country will incur discretionary stamp-out costs when 
managing livestock movement, feed procurement and labor management, and also when 
families make lifestyle accommodations during an outbreak.  
 
Model 
Setup 
This is a continuous time model. There are two possible states, namely the susceptible (S) and 
infected (I) states. These states refer to the country’s disease status and not to farm or animal 
disease status. In the susceptible state, each agent earns profit w . There are N agents, 
alternatively referred to as farms or growers, labeled {1,2, ... , } Nn N   . Grower n  will 
take a disease prevention effort of magnitude 0na    and the continuous flow cost of taking 
this effort level is ( ; )a nc a  , a twice continuously differentiable function that is increasing and 
weakly convex in na . Parameter   represents a cost shift where we assume that cost increases 
in the shift (i.e., ( ; ) 0a nc a   ). Grower n  receives payoff , ( ; )S n a nw c a    as a continuous 
flow in the susceptible state.  
Ceteris paribus, an increase in prevention effort by any one grower lowers the hazard rate, 
0 1( , , ... , )Nh a a , for disease presence in a country where the government’s level of prevention 
efficiency or effort is represented by 0 0h   and ( )   is decreasing in each action. To be more 
specific, we assume that 0 1 0 1( , , ... , ) ( )Nh a a H h h A   , 
N
nn
A a  , where ( )H   is twice 
continuously differentiable, decreasing and weakly convex, while 1 0h  . The hazard rate 
function is decreasing to reflect positive marginal benefit of actions to prevent infection and 
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the function is convex to reflect diminishing returns to the action. The linear aggregation, 
N
nn
A a  , reflects our view that prevention efforts are ‘public goods’ provided to other 
growers. That is, the benefit from avoiding a trade ban is non-excludable and non-rival. It is a 
country public good where the public in this case is the set of all growers in the country (Kaul, 
Grunberg, and Stern 1999). Linear summation requires that actions be technical substitutes in 
prevention )i.e., 21( ) ( ) 0j ka aH h H     ) or an increase in ja  renders ka  less effective in 
reducing the hazard of contracting the disease. Parameter 0h , public prevention effort, could 
reflect expenditure on a public health campaign or on border measures to reduce disease 
prevalence within a region. It also substitutes with private effort as 
0 1
( ) ( ) 0
jh a
H h H     . We 
refer to 0 1h h A  as total prevention effort. 
In the infected state, each grower earns amount w L  where L  is the loss from being 
locked out from international markets. Thus, we assume that a trade ban is put in place 
immediately when the diseases occur. We think that this is a reasonable approximation for the 
sorts of animal diseases at issue. We also assume that trade will not resume until the disease is 
eradicated in the country. This is the intent of the WTO when overseeing country-to-country 
trade bans, although in reality it may be difficult to ascertain when the disease has truly been 
eradicated and some countries may seek to continue the ban long after objective evidence 
indicates little remaining cause for concern.  
Denote the stamp-out effort taken by grower n  as magnitude 0nb   where the continuous 
flow of taking effort level nb  is ( ; )
b
nc b  , again increasing and convex in choice argument nb  
and increasing in cost parameter  . Therefore, in the infected state grower n  receives a payoff 
of , ( ; )I n b nw L c b     as a continuous flow. The probability rate for recovery is 
0 1( , , ... , )Ng b b  where public sector effort is given as 0 0g  . Public sector effort might be 
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viewed as expenditure on a public animal health campaign, or effort to reduce the extent of 
background infection through channels other than inter-personal interactions. Of course each 
effort has some effect (i.e., ( )   is increasing in each of the effort levels 0g  and ,n Nb n ).  
We will also require the form of ( )   to be such that the nb  are technical substitutes 
because success involves a joint effort to recover. Stamp-out efforts are public goods because it 
would be practically impossible to exclude a grower from the benefits while grower benefits 
are non-rival. To provide a specific and tractable form we let 0 1( )G g g B   , 
N
nn
B b  , 
where ( )G   is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and (at least weakly) concave while 
1 0g  . Here 0 1g g B , the argument in ( )G  , is referred to as total stamp-out effort. 
 
Discounted Expected Present Value 
We define S ,nV  and I ,nV  as grower n’s discounted expected present value (DEPV) in the 
susceptible and infected states, respectively. Let r be the continuous time discount rate. Let   
be the intensity parameter for a Poisson process, independent of other variables in the model, 
such that valuation collapses to 0 if the shock materializes (Taylor and Karlin 1984). This 
process is intended to reflect exogenous risks to each of the farms. As is well-known, such a 
process modifies the discount rate from r  to r  . The fundamental valuation equations are 
as given by   
 , , , , , , , ,( ) ( );  ( ) ( );S n S n I n S n I n I n S n I nr V V V r V V V                (1) 
see Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for a similar application. Each equation takes the form that 
DEPV times the sum of interest rate and valuation collapse shock parameter equals the 
instantaneous payoff plus the expected gains or losses from a state transition. That is, benefit 
flow from being in the given state equals instantaneous benefit given the present state plus the 
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valuation implication of an instantaneous state transition. 
The solution to (1) is  
 
, , , ,
, ,
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
( ) ( ); ;
( ) ( , , , , , ) ( ) ( , , , , , )
( , , , , , ) ( ) ( ).
S n I n S n I n
S n I nr rV V
r r g h A B r r g h A B
r g h A B r r G g g B H h h A
       
     
     
       
         
 (2) 
Equation set (2) may be written as 
 
, 0 1
, 0 1
( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )] ;
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )] .
( ) ( )
a b a
S n
b b a
I n
w c H h h A L c cV
r r
w L c G g g B L c cV
r r
  
  
         
          
 (3) 
The difference in the DEPV between the two states is: 
 , , ( ) ( ) .
( )
b a
S n I n L c cV V 
       (4) 
The surplus value in the susceptible state can be viewed as a bond paying benefit flow 
( ) ( )b aL c c     at discount rate ( )   (Hennessy 2007).  
 
First Best 
Under the susceptible state, first-best choices are given by the choice vector 1( , ... , )Na a  that 
maximizes ,
N
S S n
n
V ‹ , in other words,  
 
1( , ... , )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
max .
( ) ( )
N NN
N
b aa
n nn
a a
H NL c cNw c
r r  
 
          
 
 (5) 
Notice that the objective function is both symmetric and concave in the na . Thus, for any value 
of A  and any N-tuple 1( , ... , )Nb b , the equal values N-tuple 1( , ... , ) ( / , ... , / )Na a A N A N  
maximizes benefit. By symmetry it should also be clear that the infected state objective 
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function is also concave in the nb . Therefore, we may write the objective function as3  
 
0 1
0 0
[ ( ; )] ( ) ( , ; , )max ;
( ) ( , , , , , )
( , ; , ) [ ( ; ) ( ; )] ;
a sc
a
sc b a
w c a N H h h Na M a b
r r r g h Na Nb
M a b L c b c a N
  
   
   
  
  
 (6) 
where ( )scM   is the difference across states in social cost.  
In optimality it will necessarily be the case that ( ) 0scM   . This is because it would never 
be optimal for infected state loss ( )bL c  , including stamp-out effort costs, to exceed what 
one spends seeking to avoid the loss. The optimality condition is 
 
1[ ( )] ( ) ( )( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( )
sc
S a
a a
r G N h H Mc
r

  
             
‹  (7) 
We write the solution as ( )soa b  where we will shortly explore the nature of the response in 
( )soa b . 
Condition (7) can be viewed as a marginal cost-benefit calculation. The certain marginal 
cost of the prevention action a  in state S is ( )aac   per unit time. The expected benefit from this 
action arises from net social savings per unit time amounting to ( )scM  . These savings need to 
be multiplied by the marginal effect of action a on state transition probabilities as reflected in 
1 ( ) / ( )h H    . At any optimum the second-order condition satisfies 0Saa ‹ .4  
Similarly, under the infected state first-best choices are given by the choice vector 
1( , ... , )Nb b  that maximizes 
,
N
I I n
n
V ‹  (i.e., upon recognizing concavity in 1( , ... , )Nb b ) 
and what that means for socially optimal choices, 
 0 1
0 0
[ ( ; )] ( ) ( , ; , )max .
( ) ( , , , , , )
b sc
n
b
w L c b N G g g Nb M a b
r r r g h Na Nb
  
   
     (8) 
                                                 
3 Technically, we only need Schur-concavity. See Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold (2010, 21). 
4 See supplemental materials for calculations. 
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The optimality condition for (8) is  
 1[ ( )] ( ) ( )( ) 0,
( ) ( ) ( )
sc
I b
b b
r H N g G Mc
r

  
             
‹  (9) 
where we write the solution as ( )sob a  and the marginal interpretation of condition (9) is as 
with (7). The second-order optimality condition satisfies 0Ibb ‹ .  
Finally, it is readily calculated that 0S Iab ba ‹ ‹ , where details are provided in 
supplemental materials. These vanishing cross derivatives mean that, at the optimum, social 
welfare maximizing choices are locally independent across states (i.e., the b  is not relevant in 
( )soa b  and the a  is not relevant in ( )sob a ). This may be surprising, but remember that choices 
are made in different states of nature so that the other decision may be viewed as given. 
In summary, we have the pair of optimality conditions 
 
1 0 1
0 0
1 0 1
0 0
( ) ( , ; , ) ( ; );
( , , , , , )
( ) ( , ; , ) ( ; ).
( , , , , , )
so sc so so
a so
aso so
so sc so so
b so
bso so
h H h Nh a M a b c a
r g h A B
g G g Ng b M a b c b
r g h Na Nb
   
   
  
  
 (10) 
We consider now how the socially optimum levels respond to exogenous parameter changes 
including exogenous changes in the levels of prevention and stamp-out efforts (i.e., public 
efforts). It is readily established, and should not be surprising to learn, that / 0soda dL   and 
/ 0sodb dL  . More interesting are the effects of an increase in public effort in one disease state 
on the socially optimal level of private effort in the other state. We find  
 0 0
0; 0;
so soda db
dg dh
   (11) 
and so we have  
Result 1: An increase in exogenous stamp-out effort decreases the socially optimal level of 
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privately chosen prevention effort. An increase in exogenous prevention effort increases the 
socially optimal level of privately chosen stamp-out effort. 
The divergent responses are as one might expect. The socially optimal response to an 
exogenous increase in the provision of stamp-out effort is to reduce private prevention efforts. 
This is because the likely sojourn time in the infected state declines as exogenous stamp-out 
effort increases. The response does not involve moral hazard as we are referring to socially 
optimal effort levels. The response is one of crowding out, but across states of nature. On the 
other hand, the socially optimal response to an exogenous increase in prevention effort is to 
increase private levels of stamp-out effort. This is because the likely sojourn time in the 
susceptible state increases, raising the benefits arising from eradication. The response reflects 
complementarity between government prevention effort and private stamp-out effort.  
We turn now to socially optimal within state responses to exogenous (or government-
supported) increases in effort. The responses are shown to have qualitative signs (i.e., 
sign ) as 
follows:  
 
sign sign
2 2
0 0
[ ( )] ( ) ( ); ( ) ( ) [ ( )] 0.
so soda dbH H G G
dh dg
                (12) 
Within the infected state, the exogenous increase in stamp-out effort increases the transition 
probability and so reduces private incentives to act. This response is captured by the term 
2[ ( )]G  . There is also a term, as reflected in ( ) ( )G   , that captures decreasing returns to 
stamp-out effort where the transition and decreasing returns effects buttress each other. On the 
other hand, the response to an exogenous increase in prevention effort is ambiguous without 
further information. The transition probability effect, 2[ ( )]H   , is positive but is counteracted 
by a crowding out effect due to decreasing returns on total effort applied to prevention.  
Now suppose that the susceptible state hazard rate is of constant relative curvature form 
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1 0 1( )
0 1 0 0 1( ) , 0, 0
h h AH h h A e        , a form commonly used in empirical analysis (Greene 
2003, 792–797). Then 1 0 1( )2 2 20 1 1[ ( )] ( ) ( ) [ ( )] 0
h h AH H r G h e                  and the 
decreasing returns effect would dominate the transition probability effect. Indeed, the 
comparative strength of the transition probability effect is determined by discount rate r, 
exogenous value collapse intensity parameter  , and infected state hazard rate ( )G  . If any of 
these is large then one’s sense of concern about future adverse states is small and the transition 
probability effect is comparatively weaker. 
We turn now to consider total responses to endowment shocks, and there we have 
 
2 2 2
0 1 0 1 1
2
0 0 1
( ) ( ) ( )[ ( )] [ ( )] ( )0; .
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
so so b sc
bb
b sc
bb
d h Nh a d g Ng b c Ng G M
dh dg c Ng G M

 
               
 (13) 
Total prevention effort increases in response to 0h  and we can therefore infer that the expected 
time that the population spends in the diseased state declines. However we cannot sign the 
socially optimal response of total stamp-out effort to public stamp-out effort without further 
information. Upon comparing the first and second expressions in (12) with the corresponding 
expressions in (13), it can be seen that the total effort response in social optimum can be signed 
only if the private effort response in social optimum cannot be signed.  
Upon inserting optimality condition (10) into (13) we have  
 
2 2 2
1 sign
0 1 11
2
0 1
( ) ( )( )[ ( )] [ ( )]
( ) ( ) ( )( ) .
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
b
b b
bbso so b so
bb
bb sc
bbb
cc Ng G
d g Ng b b c Ng b Gg G
dg cc Ng G M

 
                  
 (14) 
If stamp-out marginal cost is elastic to effort when compared with stamp-out hazard rate 
sensitivity to effort then overall stamp-out effort in social optimum will increase in response to 
public stamp-out effort. This is because crowding out of the stamp-out action will be small. 
As for the impact of cost shocks, comparative statics yield  
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sign sign
1 1
sign sign
1 1
( ) ( ) 0; ( ) ( ) 0;
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ); ( ) ( ) ( ) ( );
so so
b a
so so
a a b b
a b
da dbh H Nc g G Nc
d d
da dbh H c N c g G Nc c
d d
 
   
 
  
          
              
(15) 
which may be summarized as:  
Result 2: An increase in the cost of stamp-out effort increases the socially optimal level of 
prevention effort while an increase in the cost of prevention effort decreases the socially 
optimal level of stamp-out effort. If an increase in the cost of prevention effort also increases 
the marginal cost of prevention effort (i.e., ( ) 0aac    ), then such a cost increase decreases the 
socially optimal level of prevention effort.  
It seems quite intuitive that as the cost of stamping out increases then the benefits of 
prevention actions increase to avoid entering the more costly infection state. Similarly, if the 
cost of prevention increases then the benefits of stamp-out actions decrease because success in 
stamping out has become less rewarding. It is reasonable to assume that ( ) 0aac     so the 
socially optimal level of prevention likely decreases in response to an increase in the cost of 
prevention effort.  
The remaining comparative static, /sodb d  is least readily signed. As it is reasonable to 
assume that ( ) 0bbc    , it follows that there are two opposing effects.  
Result 3: If the stamp-out marginal cost shock is sufficiently inelastic with respect to stamp-out 
effort, or 1 ( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( )
so so b b
bg b G N b c c       , then the socially optimal level of stamp-out effort 
will increase with an increase in the cost of stamp-out effort.  
 This somewhat contrary optimal response arises because the cost shock changes the 
desirability of being in the disease-free state. If the change in cost of stamp-out effort in the 
infected state, ( )bc  , is sufficiently large in comparison with the change in marginal cost of the 
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action, ( )bbc   , then it would be best to bite the bullet and put in more effort in order to hasten 
escape from the infected state. 
 
Private Optimality Conditions 
Given (3), the private optimization problems for the nth agent in the susceptible and infected 
states are to ,max
n
S n
a V  and 
,max
n
I n
b V , respectively, in other words,  
 
,
,
,
( ) ( ) ( )max ;
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )max ;
( ) ( )
( , ; , ) ( ; ) ( ; ).
n
n
a pc n
a
b pc n
b
pc n b a
n n n n
w c H M
r r
w L c G M
r r
M a b L c b c a
  
  
   
     
      
  
 (16) 
The Nash private optimality conditions are  
 
,
1
,
1
[ ( )] ( ) ( )( ; ) 0;
( ) ( ) ( )
[ ( )] ( ) ( )( ; ) 0;
( ) ( ) ( )
pc n
a po
a n
pc n
b po
b n
r G h H Mc a
r
r H g G Mc b
r
   
   
           
           
 (17) 
with private optimality choices pona  and 
po
nb . It bears emphasis that 
, ( )pc nM   is similar to 
( )scM  , as given in (6), in that a loss difference across states ( ) ( )b aL c c     is involved. 
However the difference is not multiplied by N as only private losses enter the decision 
calculations.  
In order to establish uniqueness of any pure strategy solution to this game, we need to 
confirm that the cumulative reaction function is decreasing with slope larger, or less negative, 
than -1 (Vives 1999, theorem 2.8).5 That is, we require that  
                                                 
5 The conditions for the theorem to apply are that the best reply of one action to the sum of 
other actions be a single-valued function on a compact set. We have no reason to suspect that 
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 \
,
,
\, ( 1,0); .
n n
N j n
n n
S n
a A
n jS n j
a a
V
A a
V 
      (18) 
where calculations are provided in supplemental materials. Condition 
\
, ,/ 0
n n n n
S n S n
a A a aV V 
 
is true 
if and only if 2[ ( )] ( ) ( )H H     . The latter condition is certainly true whenever ( )H   is log-
convex, or 2 20ln[ ( )] / 0d H dh   so that it would apply were 1 0 1( )0 1 0( ) h h AH h h A e     ,   
0 10, 0   . Indeed, from (12) we have that log-convexity of ( )   in 0h  is both necessary 
and sufficient to ensure the intuitive comparative static 0/ 0
soda dh  . As we show in the 
supplemental materials, 
\
, ,/ 1
n n n n
S n S n
a A a aV V    is true so we can be quite confident about the 
uniqueness of any pure-strategy equilibrium.  
Similarly, for uniqueness in pure strategy solutions we require that  
 \
,
,
\, ( 1,0); .
n n
N j n
n n
I n
b B
n jI n j
b b
V
B b
V 
      (19) 
Now 
\
, ,/ 0
n n n n
I n I n
b B b bV V   if and only if 2( ) ( ) [ ( )]G G      , which is true whenever ( )G   is 
concave. As we also show in supplemental materials, 
\
, ,/ 1
n n n n
I n I n
b B b bV V    can be boiled down to 
the elasticity condition 1 ( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( )
po po b b
n n bb bg b G b c c      . If the elasticity of stamp-out marginal 
cost-to-own action is large when compared with the relative sensitivity of stamp-out ‘hazard’ 
to stamp-out action, then this sufficient condition for uniqueness in pure strategies applies. 
Notice that the condition is weaker (without N multiplying 1g ) than the condition identified in 
(14) above for the socially optimal value of total stamp-out effort to increase with an 
exogenous government increase in stamp-out effort, or 0 1 0( ) / 0
sod g Ng b dg  . So the 
condition appears to be quite reasonable.  
                                                                                                                                                          
these conditions are onerous in this application. 
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The own-effect cross-derivatives are , , 0
n n n n
S n I n
a b a bV V  . As in social optimality, this 
independence between own actions across states is because choices are made in different states 
and may be taken as given. Furthermore, the in-state, cross-agent cross-derivatives are  
 
 
 
2 , 2
1,
3
2 , 2
1,
3
[ ( )] ( ) [ ( )] ( ) ( )
| ;
( )[ ( )]
[ ( )] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( )]
| 0.
( )[ ( )]
n j
n j
pc n
S n
a a j n
pc n
I n
b b j n
r G h M H H
V
r
r H g M G G
V
r
 
 
 
 


          
          
 (20) 
Result 4: Stamp-out actions are strategic substitutes. Prevention actions are complements if and 
only if 0/ 0
soda dh   (i.e., if and only if an increase in exogenous prevention effort elicits an 
increase in the socially optimal level of private prevention effort). 
As discussed under (12) above, if prevention actions are to complement then technical 
decreasing returns to prevention effort, as captured by ( ) ( )H    , should not be large when 
compared with the transition probability effect, as reflected in 2[ ( )]H   . To be clear here, even 
though we have stacked the tables in favor of substitution between efforts, through technical 
substitutability between efforts via 0 1( )H h h A  and 0 1( )G g g B , it is plausible that 
prevention efforts are strategic complements. However, we have already found 0/ 0
soda dh   
to be a sufficient condition for a unique solution in Nash equilibrium. So if prevention efforts 
are strategic complements then there may be multiple solutions, a situation that is well-known 
to students of games with strategic complementarities (Milgrom and Shannon 1994). 
The relations in (20) allow us to comment on system-wide responses to shocks under Nash 
equilibrium. The approach taken is to establish whether the game we study is supermodular 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990) (i.e., whether the agents’ strategies interact in a qualitatively 
unidirectional manner). If so, then an exogenous adjustment to the system could impact all 
actions in a beneficial, reinforcing way. For example, a subsidy on any one action would 
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induce an increase in all equilibrium choices under optimal behavior. Is this likely to happen? 
We need to consider all grower responses in order to provide a theoretically grounded opinion. 
The interactions among efforts for different states and agents comprise part of a system-
wide response, and these interactions are: 
 , ,| 0; | 0.
n j n j
S n I n
a b j n b a j nV V    (21) 
An increase in stamp-out actions on the part of someone else decreases marginal product of 
prevention effort, whereas an increase in prevention action on the part of someone else 
increases marginal product of stamp-out actions. The rationales for these responses are 
essentially as given in Result 1 above. In Nash equilibrium, someone else’s choice can be 
viewed as an exogenous public choice (i.e., jb  and ja  in (21) replace 0g  and 0h  in (11), 
respectively). Furthermore,  
 
, , ,
, , , 1
0 if ( ) 0; 0; 0;
[ ( )] ( )0; 0; ( ) .
( ) ( ) ( )
n n n
n n n
S n a S n S n
a a a L a
b
I n I n I n b
b b L b b
V c V V
r H g G cV V V c
r
  

    
    
            
 (22) 
Interactions (20)–(22) allow for contemplation of Nash equilibrium responses to external 
shocks. Consider what would happen in the system were the value of loss L  to increase. 
Marginal products of both actions would increase as , 0
n
S n
a LV   and , 0nI nb LV  . Under Result 4 we 
have conditions such that any incentive to increase na  would reinforce incentives to increase 
the level of ,ja j n . Then, from , | 0n jI nb a j nV    in (21), this would reinforce private incentives to 
increase nb  in Nash equilibrium. However, another path of incentive spillovers that one could 
follow is that L  increases the incentive to increase jb  on the part of some agent j. Then, from 
Result 4, this increase in jb  reduces the marginal product of nb  and so the incentive to take 
that stamp-out action decreases along this path. Whether the first, second, or another pathway 
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is more important in determining the ultimate response of nb  to a change in L  is not clear. 
Such dissonance pervades the system so that the game is not supermodular and, in general, 
little can be established about how ( , )po pon na b  respond to 0 0( , , , , )L h g   in Nash equilibrium. 
An implication is that it is, in general, difficult to compare the levels of first-best actions with 
privately optimal actions.  
 
Specific Technology 
The above has not enabled us to compare first-best with Nash equilibrium solutions. In the 
following example we seek to shed some light on the comparison. Let  
 
1
1
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
( ) , 0, 0;
( ) , 0, 0;
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [0,( ) / ], 0, 0;
( ) 0, 0, 0;
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aa a a a
n
bb b b b
n
c a e
c b e
H h h A h h h A A h h h h h h
G g g B g g B B g g


  
  
  
  
         
      
 (23) 
where the cost functions are convex. Transition rate function ( )G   is concave, while ( )H   is 
convex as previously assumed, although neither are strictly so. A point to note here is that, due 
to linearity, decreasing marginal benefits to actions do not play a role in hazard rate functions 
from here on out. 
In supplemental materials we demonstrate that symmetric Nash equilibrium solutions for 
prevention actions solve 
 
1
1 0 1
1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0
ln
,
ˆ ,
a po
a a
b b
aa po
b b a b a a a
gNg
h g h g h h LN a e
r g h h

 
        
 

                  
    
 (24) 
which we also write as 10 1 2
a poapoa e       with the obvious values for 0 , 1  and 2 . Now 
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1
aae   is positive and decreasing in the value of a . If 1 1 1 1/ /
a bh g   then we may say that a  is 
‘less responsive’ than b . We use that term because the condition has the prevention marginal 
cost increase quickly and the prevention hazard rate decrease slowly when compared with 
stamp-out marginal cost and hazard rate. 
When 0 2   and 1 0   then it is clear that a unique and strictly positive solution exists, 
as depicted in Figure 1a. When 0 2   and 1 0   then no positive solution exists. The 
parameters summing to   are too large to support a unilateral deviation from 0poa  . This 
would be the case when the discount rate and/or probability of collapse are large, public 
contribution to stamp-out is large, or public contribution to prevention is small. When 0 2   
and 1 0   then there may be zero or two solutions, ignoring the case of tangency. Figure 1b 
depicts the case where there are two solutions, with the smaller of the two being the only stable 
solution.6 Figure 1c depicts one of the two cases where there are no strictly positive stable 
solutions. The other is when 0 2  , then either the line does not intersect the exponentially 
decaying curve in the strictly positive domain or the line intersects the curve just once and 
from above so that the solution is not stable. 
Some calculation also provides  
 
1
1 0 1
1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1
ln
.
b po
a a
b b
bb po
a b a b a b b
gNh
h g h g h g LN b e 
 
        

                  
 (25) 
                                                 
6 To see this, write (24) as 10 1 1 0 1/ ( )
a poaa a poe h L a      where the left-hand side is marginal 
cost and the right-hand side can be viewed as marginal private benefit. The first intersection, at 
,po la  in Figure 1b, involves marginal cost rising from below to meet marginal private benefit so 
that profit would fall upon a small unilateral deviation. The second intersection, at ,po ha  in 
Figure 1b, involves marginal benefit rising to meet marginal cost so that profit would rise upon 
a small unilateral deviation. The first intersection is locally stable to small perturbations 
whereas the second is not. 
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Similar to (24), a unique, strictly positive solution is assured whenever 1 1 1 1/ /
b ag h   and 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1/ ( ) ln[ / ( )] / ( / / )
b b a a b b a b ag L Nh g h g h             . Notice that the left-hand 
sides of (24) and (25) are both upward sloping in their respective actions whenever prevention 
is less responsive than stamp-out activities. Whether or not 1 1 1 1/ /
b ag h  , we can state from 
(24) and (25):  
Result 5: If a stable solution exists in pure strategy then an increase in trade ban loss L   
increases the privately optimal levels of both prevention and stamp-out actions. 
 Given , 0
n
S n
a LV   and , 0nI nb LV    in (22), Result 5 may not appear surprising. However, follow 
through , 0
n
I n
b LV   to , | 0n jS na b j nV    in (21) to obtain an indirect contrary effect of L  on prevention 
efforts that might conceivably have overwhelmed the direct effect. However, not so for this 
technology. 
A further point to note about (24) and (25) is that in (24) both prevention cost parameters 
0
a  and 1a  have reinforcing impacts in that an increase in their magnitude decreases the value 
of the left-hand side and increase the value on the right-hand side. Thus, in Nash equilibrium 
an increase in prevention costs decreases private prevention activities. By contrast, in (25) 
eradication cost parameters 0
b  and 1b  have contrary impacts in that an increase in their 
magnitude decreases the value of both sides of the equation. Private stamp-out efforts may 
increase with an increase in private costs incurred. This Nash equilibrium comparative static 
corresponds to the social first-best comparative static provided in Result 3 above, and the 
rationale is the same. An increase in any cost of being in the infected state, even the cost of 
trying to exit the state, may motivate growers to try all the harder to exit.  
Next we turn to first-best solutions. In light of optimality condition set (10) and the 
functional forms given in (23) above, we arrive at  
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 (26)  
It is apparent from (24)–(26) that when 1 1 1 1/ /
b ag h  , then both so poa a  and so pob b . 
Figure 2 illustrates a comparison between social optimum and Nash private optimum. In panel 
A, 1 0   so prevention action is less responsive than stamp-out action. The line for the 
socially optimal level of prevention is lower than that for the Nash equilibrium level of 
prevention. Nash equilibrium does not emphasize prevention in part because it is 
comparatively ineffective. The exponentially decaying curve is higher due to the inclusion of N 
in (26) to acknowledge the public good effect of stamping out. Thus, the socially optimal level 
of stamp-out action must be larger than the privately optimal choice.  
In panel b), 1 0   ensures that the line is higher under social optimum. The exponentially 
decaying curve is also higher, as before. By itself, the upward line shift would decrease the 
optimal level of stamp-out action but the action’s public good effect counters so it is 
conceivable that the socially optimal level of private stamp-out effort is smaller than the Nash 
optimal level of private stamp-out effort.  
Result 6: Under the technologies provided in (23), whenever a  is less responsive than b  (i.e., 
1 1 1 1/ /
a bh g  ) then the Nash optimal levels of private prevention and stamp-out efforts are 
both lower than the socially optimal levels. 
What is most interesting here is the asymmetry between prevention and stamp-out 
activities. If prevention is comparatively less responsive then more of both actions should be 
taken than are taken. This is because the disease is managed primarily by stamp-out efforts. 
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From , | 0
n j
I n
b b j nV    in (20) and , | 0n jS na b j nV    in (21), we can conclude that comparatively high 
levels of stamp-out effort reduce the incentives of others to support stamp-out efforts and to 
prevent. If prevention is comparatively more effective than efforts to stamp-out then a 
comparison between socially optimal choices and privately optimal choices is less clear cut, as 
reflected in panel B of Figure 2.  
Notice, too, in (24)–(26) that an increase in 0 0ˆr g h h       through any of an 
increase in interest rate, exogenous increase in farm value collapse, increase in public stamp-
out effort, or decrease in public prevention effort will shift the value of 0  up. The equations 
together with the figures reveal the consequences.  
Result 7: Under the technologies provided in (23), an increase in interest rate, Poisson value 
collapse intensity parameter or public stamp-out effort, or decrease in public prevention effort 
will decrease all of poa , pob , soa  and sob  (i.e., all of privately and socially optimal prevention 
and stamp-out efforts). 
The reason is quite straightforward and we illustrate with reference to business collapse 
intensity. All efforts regard seeking to either continue in the susceptible state or attain the 
susceptible state. Costs of effort are immediate whereas benefits are deferred. When the 
probability of a business collapse not related to disease increases, then the decision calculus 
shifts toward cutting back on effort because the prospective benefit is less likely to materialize. 
A similar phenomenon arises in human capital formation. Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey (2013) 
compare education decisions among individuals that were ex ante equally likely to be subject 
to a genetic mutation, giving rise to the fatal Huntington’s disease. Their evidence shows that 
those who learn through a genetic test that they do have the causal mutation subsequently apply 
less effort to job training and education when compared with those who learn the converse.  
Finally we ask what would be the impact of scaling up costs on Nash equilibrium solutions. 
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We consider (24)–(25) as a system. When only prevention costs are scaled up, as captured by 
an increase in 0
a , then neither 1 0 1/ ( )b bg L    nor 1 1 1 1/ /b ag h   are affected. However, the 
value of 1 0 1 1 0 1ln[ / ( )]
a a b bg h     increases so that the value of the intercept on the linear term in 
(25) increases. We can conclude that the Nash equilibrium choice of private efforts to stamp 
out decreases in response to an increase in prevention cost. Similarly, if only 0
b  increases then 
neither 1 0 1/ ( )
a ah L   2  nor 1 1 1 1/ /b ag h   are affected while 1 0 1 1 0 1ln[ / ( )]a a b bg h     decreases. 
The value of the intercept in (24) shifts down, leading to an increase in Nash equilibrium 
private prevention effort in response to an increase in the cost of stamping out.  
Result 8: Let the technologies be as provided in (23). A subsidy on overall prevention effort 
cost, or parameter 0
a , increases the Nash equilibrium level of private stamp-out effort. A 
subsidy on overall stamp-out effort cost, or parameter 0
b , decreases the Nash equilibrium level 
of private prevention effort. 
This result is consistent with socially optimal responses as identified in Result 2. It is also 
consistent with findings in Hennessy (2008), who considered prevention and cure efforts for a 
human disease where strategic dimensions to infection that arise from person-to-person 
infection were not accounted for. He found that prevention and cure efforts complement in the 
sense that an increase in prevention cost decreases cure effort. However, prevention and cure 
also substitute in the sense that an increase in cure cost increases prevention effort. The key to 
understanding these seemingly conflicting responses is to recognize that the actions are not 
taken in the same states of nature (i.e., one is taken when non-diseased while the other is taken 
when diseased). Here we show that the apparently inconsistent responses occur even when the 
private actions of other agents are recognized and accommodated.  
Alternatively, suppose that both 0
a  and 0b  decrease proportionately because policymakers 
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seek to ensure that subsidies are balanced. Then nothing changes on the left-hand sides of (24) 
and (25). This is because 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1ln( ( ) / [ ( ) ]) ln( / [ ])
a a b b a a b bg h g h        . However, the 
right-hand sides of both equations increase.  
Result 9: Under the technologies given in (23), equal proportional subsidies on private 
prevention and stamp-out efforts increase Nash equilibrium levels of both sorts of effort. 
 
Policy Implications 
Notwithstanding the complexity of the disease management context, we are prepared to 
identify four policy implications from the analysis. These are: 
Point 1: A decision environment conducive to forward-planning matters when seeking to 
remain free of an infectious animal disease. 
We have seen from Result 7 that an exogenous threat to a business decreases incentives to 
prevent a disease and to stamp out any disease that enters. There is a strong correlation 
between the countries where infectious animal diseases are endemic and the quality of the 
country’s governance structure. The OECD seeks to promote good governance among its 
comparatively wealth member countries. Among its members countries, only South Korea, 
Israel, and Turkey were not listed by the OIE as being FMD free in October 2013 whereas few 
other countries in the world were free of the disease (without vaccination). The correlation is 
unsurprising because wealthy countries can support strong public animal disease management 
infrastructure. In addition, sound public sector governance with objective performance-based 
criteria for promotion and curtailed opportunities for corruption is likely to support 
management choices that emphasize longer-run goals over political expediency or favoritism. 
However, the correlation could also be due in part to concerns about other risks, such as the 
risk of a war, government land appropriation, unpredictable trade policies that might affect 
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access to world markets, or monetary instability that could threaten firm valuations. Finally, 
the collapse intensity parameter can be taken as a stochastic asset transaction cost as would 
arise due to asset market frictions upon a sudden need to sell a business or an estate tax. The 
presence of such costs would adversely affect disease management incentives. 
Point 2: Public stamp-out efforts countenance moral hazard concerns that public prevention 
efforts do not. 
A reading of Result 8 that views public stamp-out efforts as something to be avoided would 
take the model too seriously as a depiction of the complex environment in which animal 
disease management occurs. The model treats public inputs as exogenous, but governments 
also respond to incentives including costs of exchequer funds and state-dependent political 
demands. It is likely that an analysis of endogenized public input choices would reveal some 
subtleties about how public state-contingent efforts interact when in the presence of private 
efforts that they might crowd out. These considerations are beyond the present work’s scope.  
Our stance is that a public commitment to be parsimonious in public stamp-out efforts 
would be viewed as incredible, or subgame imperfect, in light of political risks that a 
government might face once the state is realized. Consequently such an ex-ante commitment 
would be ineffective in encouraging ex-ante private prevention efforts. See, e.g., Innes’ (2003) 
study of a similar problem that arises upon the event of a widespread crop disaster. But our 
model does point to the superiority of public prevention efforts over stamp-out efforts. Public 
prevention provides a three-fold return in that it directly reduces the probability of an event, 
indirectly encourages more private sector preventive effort, and indirectly increases private 
sector stamp-out efforts. Public stamp-out effort managers should pay acute regard to 
implications for private efforts. Independent policy instruments not considered in our model, 
such as legal prosecution, may allow a government to mitigate moral hazard concerns of public 
interventions in the diseased state.  
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Point 3: An increase in the loss due to a disease outbreak will increase private incentives to 
prevent and to stamp-out while insurance indemnities will reduce these incentives. 
The possibility of a country trade ban should increase private incentives to prevent and to 
stamp-out. Although we have not shown that the finding applies beyond the specific 
technology studied, the technology’s simplicity leaves us with a qualified assurance that the 
threat of a trade ban is likely to improve biosecurity incentives all round.7 Other restrictions on 
sale of produce from a country afflicted with the disease, such as restrictions on sales within 
the country, are also likely to incentivize private prevention and stamp-out actions. The 
collective punishment for a disease break-down will encourage private prevention actions and 
the knowledge that private prevention activities will be high should stiffen resolves on the part 
of actors in the private sector to return to the uninfected state. The same response also implies 
that the presence of an indemnity program in the event of an outbreak will discourage such 
actions, a point addressed in Hennessy (2007), but in the narrower context of preventive 
actions only. If punishment for breakdown is low then the incentives to prevent are low so why 
try to stamp-out a disease that is quite likely to re-emerge?  
As qualification to the above, it is recognized that issues not addressed in this model also 
matter. One is business continuity. Indemnities serve the purpose of providing a cash flow 
lifeline to growers at a critical time. These farmers may well be severely credit constrained 
because they would have had no time to prepare for the event and because extra feed and other 
costs may arise due movement controls during the disease outbreak. In addition, banks may be 
cautious to provide liquidity when the length of the crisis is unknown. A further consideration 
                                                 
7 Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) have developed a systemic approach to aggregation games with 
strategic substitutes similar in spirit to the theory of games with strategic complementarities, as 
in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Our model fits loosely into 
the Acemoglu and Jensen framework and their approach may allow for a generalization of the 
technology set for which definite monotone responses can be obtained.  
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is the nature of the livestock industry’s business support network. Cattle marts, feed mills and 
slaughter plants in a region may have large fixed operating costs and sufficient scale can be 
important to ensuring profitability. If some farms in the region do not survive then these input 
providing and produce using businesses may increase animal production input prices or 
decrease livestock prices, which may drive more growers out of the business.  
Point 4: Although caution is warranted when devising biosecurity action subsidy schemes, it is 
generally better to subsidize prevention efforts than subsidize stamp-out efforts. 
Within the confines of the context we have modeled, and referring to Results 8 and 9 in 
particular, a subsidy on private prevention efforts would likely better secure a country from a 
disease. Of course, other aspects of an input may also be relevant. Some inputs, such as better 
fences, better record keeping, and vaccination, are dual purpose in the sense that they serve to 
help in prevention and extermination. In addition, many animal agriculture sectors are small in 
scale and geographically dispersed, especially in less developed countries and also the beef 
sector in many developed countries. It may be very difficult to monitor the extent of some 
activities that a government might seek to subsidize.  
There may also be some private inputs considered to be so critical to stamp-out endeavors 
that general point 4 should be ignored. A case that comes to mind is subsidies to facilitate the 
development of a livestock premises registry in a region confirmed to have a disease. However 
the general point is that, having sought to account for such operational concerns as monitoring 
and effectiveness, there is likely merit in tilting subsidies toward preventive efforts. 
 
Concluding Comment 
The management of defenses against a possible infectious animal disease incursion is an 
involved partnership between the public and private sectors. Inevitably uncertainty, dynamics, 
and strategic behavior inconsistent with the public good confront management. By providing a 
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model that incorporates these complications in a tractable way, we see our work as a first effort 
at developing a more coherent perspective on appropriate roles for government in securing a 
country from animal disease entry. The approach is general and does not seek to address a 
particular intervention, such as subsidies on vaccination.  
Adaption to the salient details of some particular context would shed light on the 
framework’s potential. So too would an analysis of how disease transmission parameters affect 
incentives, a development that might be accomplished through parameterizing the relation 
between effort and state transition in the two state transition probability functions. Adaptation 
in that way would not involve much adjustment to the present framework. Possible uses are an 
exploration of how openness in farmed animal industries and how specific disease 
management practices such as vaccination affect equilibrium incentives and outcomes. In our 
view, perhaps the most interesting extension would be to step back and endogenize 
government efforts with the end of introducing political incentives. Endogenous government 
effort would allow for a better understanding of best public management of a virulent disease 
when mindful of own credibility and of grower responses to public choices.  
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Figure 1. Nash equilibrium for prevention actions: 
a) θ1 ≥ 0 and 0 < θ0 < θ2; b) θ1 < 0 and 0 < θ0 < θ2
such that there are two solutions; c) θ1 < 0 and 0 < θ0 ≤ θ2 such that there are no solutions. 
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Figure 2. Comparison between social optimum and 
Nash private optimum level of prevention: a) when 
θ1 ≥ 0; b) when θ1 < 0. 
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Supplemental Materials 
Second-order condition for social optimum in susceptible and infected states: 
Define 1( ) ( ) ( ) / ( )
S a sc
a ac h H M         in (7) and 1( ) ( ) ( ) / ( )I b scb bc g G M         in (9) as the 
key terms of interest from the optimality conditions upon which to apply the implicit function 
theorem. Term [ ( )] / [ ( )]r G N r       in (7) and [ ( )] / [( ) ( )]r H N r         in (9) are 
both strictly negative so that 0S Ia b    . From (7) we have 
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Upon applying the first-order condition, the first right-hand expression falls out so that  
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(A2) 
Insert first-order condition (7) for ( )aac   to obtain: 
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(A3) 
The last inequality follows because ( ) 0aaac   , ( ) 0H     and ( ) 0scM   . 
From (9) we have  
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Upon applying first-order condition (9), the first right-hand expression falls out so that  
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Insert the first-order condition for ( )bbc   to obtain: 
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The last inequality follows because ( ) 0bbbc   , ( ) 0G    and ( ) 0scM   . 
Next, from (7) and (9) we have  
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Socially optimal responses to endowments: 
From the social optimality conditions (10) together with some calculations, we have  
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Uniqueness of any pure-strategy equilibrium 
The two derivatives are 
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[ ( )] ( ) 0;
( )[ ( )]
[ ( )] ( )( ) .
( ) ( ) ( )
n
n
n
a
I n
b
I n
b L
b
I n b
b b
r H g G cV
r
r H g GV
r
r H g G cV c
r



 

 

 

  
       
     
           
 (A35) 
 
Algebra in example in the case of Nash equilibrium: 
Under the symmetric solution we drop the agent identification subscript. We let    
0 0
ˆr g h h     and we can conclude that, in Nash equilibrium, (17) becomes 
 
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 0 0
0 1
1 1
1 0 0
0 1
1 1
( ) ;
( ) .
b po a po
a po
b po a po
b po
b ab a
aa a
po po
b ab a
bb b
po po
h L e ee
g Nb h Na
g L e ee
g Nb h Na
 

 

   
   
   
   
 
(A36) 
Taking ratios and then logging, we arrive at 1 1[ ln( )] /
po a po bb a     where    
1 0 1 1 0 1/ ( )
a a b bg h    . Also, (A36) allows us to assert that 1 1b po a pob ae e   and so  
 
1 11 1 1 1 1 0
0 1
1 1 1 1
( ) ,
a po a po
a b a
a aa a
po po b
h g he L e
g B h A h
      
        (A37) 
so that 
1 11 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1
1 1
1
/ ( ) ( ) ;
ln( )
a po a po
a a a b a
a a
a po b
po
b
h g he L e
a hNg h Na
     
   
        (A38) 
Now write 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) /
a b bg h N      and 2 1 0 1/ ( )a ah L    so that (A38) becomes  
 
11 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
( ) / ( )1 ;ln( ) ln( )
a po
a b a b
a
po po
b b
g h eNg Nga a
    
     
          
 (A39) 
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It follows that  
 
11 1 1 1 1
1 2
1 1 1
ln( ) ( ) .
a po
a b
apo
b a b
Ng g ha e      
        (A40) 
Therefore we may write  
 
11 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1
ln( ) .
a poaa po
b b a b a a a
Ng g h g h h LN a e        
              
 (A41) 
A strictly positive and unique solution is ensured whenever 1 1 1 1/ /
b ag h   and 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/ ( ) ln( ) / ( / / )
a a b b ah L Ng g h          .  
Insert 1 1[ ln( )] /
po b po aa b     into (A41) to obtain  
 
11 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1
ln( ) .
b pobb po
a b a b a b b
Nh g h g h g LN b e        
              
 (A42) 
Here too a strictly positive and unique solution is assured whenever 1 1 1 1/ /
b ag h   and 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/ ( ) ln( ) / ( / / )
b b a b ag L Nh g h          . 
  
Algebra in example in the case of Social optimum: 
Next we turn to first-best solutions. In light of optimality conditions (10) and the functional 
forms given in (23) above, we have social optimality conditions 
 
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 0 0
0 1
1 1
1 0 0
0 1
1 1
( ) ;
( ) .
b so a so
a so
b so a so
b so
b ab a
aa a
so so
b ab a
bb b
so so
Nh L e ee
g Nb h Na
Ng L e ee
g Nb h Na
 

 

   
   
   
   
 
(A43) 
Therefore 1 1
b so a sob ae e   as before, and  
 
1 11
0 1 0 0
1 1
( ) ;
a so a soa aa a b a
so so
Nhe L e
g Nb h Na
             (A44)
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and 
 
1 11 0 1
0 0
1 1 1
1
1 1
/ ( ) ( ) .
ln( )
a so a so
a a
a ab a
a so
so
b b
Nhe L e
Ng a Ngh Na
        
        (A45) 
This means that 
 
11 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
( ) / ( )1 .ln( ) ln( )
a so
a b a b
a
so so
b b
N g h NeNg Nga a
    
     
          
 (A46) 
Therefore,  
 
11 1 1 1 1
1 2
1 1 1
ln( ) ( ) ,
a so
a b
aso
b a b
Ng N g ha e N      
        (A47) 
and we may write  
 
11
0 1 2
1
( 1) .
a soaso
a
N a N e
N
  
    (A48) 
Similarly, insert 1 1 1( / ) ln( ) /
so b a so aa b      into (A48) to obtain  
 
11 1 1 1
0 2
1 1 1
ln( ) ( 1) .
b so
b
bso
a a a
N b N e
N
       
     (A49) 
